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ABSTRACT  
This paper investigates to what extent the structure of the 
Russian interbank market over the period 1998-2004 can 
be described by applying the core-periphery model as 
defined by Craig and von Peter (2014), using a greedy 
algorithm. It finds that the fit is significant, although the 
error score of 54 percent is relatively high compared to 
earlier studies which applied this core-periphery model to 
more mature interbank markets. Additionally, this paper 
finds that the fit of the core-periphery model deteriorates as 
loan maturity increases. Finally, this paper concludes that a 
bank can also be classified as belonging to the core by 
doing a probit regression on a single balance sheet variable.   
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INTRODUCTION  
This paper investigates the complex structure of the 
Russian interbank market using a core-periphery (CP) 
model, over the period 1998-2004.   
The interbank market can be defined as the financial system 
of banks that trade currency between each other (extend 
loans to one another) for a specified term (maturity). This 
market excludes central banks and retail investors. Most 
interbank loans are made for a maturity of a week or less, 
and the majority of loans has an overnight maturity.  
To be able to more effectively safeguard stability on 
financial markets, gaining a better insight into the structure 
of interbank markets is crucial. Recent research (Cocco et 
al., 2009 and Bräuning and Fecht, 2016) has argued that the 
interbank market should not be seen as a collection of 
unrelated transactions, but as a complex system, and should 
also be treated as such.  
Traditionally, the interbank market has been modeled as 
flat: no attention was paid to any potential complex 
network structures. However, since the start of the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2007 it has become clear that an 
understanding of the complex structure of interbank 
markets is crucial for safeguarding financial stability.   The 
exact structure of any interbank market network has a clear 
influence on its stability:  theoretical research found that if 
a network is complete (this translates to all banks being 
connected to all other banks), a shock to a single bank can 
easily be shared amongst all agents. However, if few banks 
have many connections and many banks have few 
connections, it can have severe consequences if one of the  
 
 
banks with many connections fail (Allen and Gale, 2000). 
Hence, a better insight in the structure of the interbank 
market is of vital importance for the health and stability of 
this market.  
This paper aims to contribute the following to the field of 
interbank structure research: firstly, it applies the core-
periphery model as defined by Craig and von Peter (2014) 
to the Russian interbank market. This core-periphery model 
has been applied to several interbank markets before, such 
as the German (Craig and von Peter, 2014), Dutch (in ‘t 
Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014), UK (Langfield et al., 2014) 
and Italian (Fricke and Lux, 2015) one. However, all the 
above interbank markets are generally regarded fully 
mature. The Russian interbank market is much younger and 
had not reached full maturity yet between 1998-2004. This 
makes it an interesting case to investigate. Therefore, 
another aim of this paper is to investigate to what extent the 
core-periphery model can provide an accurate description 
of a young and not yet fully mature interbank market, such 
as the Russian one.  
Additionally, this paper divides the data into three separate 
layers based on loan maturity (overnight, short-term and 
long-term) and investigates the fit of the CP model for each 
layer individually. Previous research has found that most 
interbank loans have a relatively short maturity (Alfonso 
and Lagos, 2015). Separating the data into layers will 
provide insight into the question whether the fit of the core-
periphery model deteriorates as maturity grows.  
Finally, this paper investigates whether a bank can be 
classified as belonging to the core or the periphery by 
performing a simple probit regression on specific bank 
balance sheet variables. Bilateral interbank transaction data 
is not available for every market, so this probit approach 
could prove to be more feasible in many cases. To the best 
of my knowledge, this specific combination of 
investigations has not been applied to the Russian interbank 
market before.  
  
THE CORE-PERIPHERY MODEL  
Definition  
To gain a better insight into the structure of the Russian 
interbank market, this paper makes use of the core-
periphery (CP) model. This model originates from the field 
of sociology (Borgatti and Everett, 2000) and was slightly 
adapted for the purpose of modelling interbank markets by 
Craig and von Peter (2014) who were also the first to apply 
this model to an interbank market, in their case the German 
market. In the remainder of this paper, any reference to a 
CP model or structure refers to the CP model as defined and 
used by Craig and von Peter (2014).  
Further empirical research on interbank markets in other 
countries has confirmed that this core-periphery model is 
an adequate way to describe the complex network of 
interbank markets. Besides Germany, the interbank 
markets of the Netherlands (in ‘t Veld and van Lelyveld, 
2014), the UK (Langfield et al., 2014) and Italy (Fricke and 
Lux, 2015) have all successfully been investigated using 
the core-periphery model.   
The main idea behind the CP structure is that core banks 
interact with both periphery banks and other core banks, 
core banks serve as intermediates between periphery banks, 
and periphery banks only interact with core banks, but not 
with each other. To summarize this, a perfect core-
periphery structure satisfies the following conditions:  
• Core banks all lend to and borrow from each other.  
• Periphery banks do not lend to or borrow from each 
other.  
• Core banks lend to and borrow from at least one 
periphery bank.  
A visual example of a network that satisfies these 
conditions is shown in Figure 1.   
  
Figure 1: A visual example of a perfect CP structure, 
where A, B and C form the core and D, E, F, G and H the 
periphery. Graphic borrowed from in ‘t Veld and van 
Lelyveld (2014).   
Implementation  
The lending and borrowing activities of any interbank 
market can be represented in a square matrix format. If a 
market contains n active banks, the size of this matrix 
will be n*n.   
Since the CP model employed in this paper focuses only 
on the structure of linkages, not on their relative size, all 
positive elements in this matrix can be set equal to 1 to 
obtain a binary matrix. Now, the number 1 represents the 
existence of a link between two banks, and the number 0 
denotes the absence of a link. This is the observed (real) 
network N.   
The next step is to compare the observed network N to an 
ideal CP structure of similar size, M, and investigate the 
fit.  To be able to do this, this paper makes use of an 
algorithm that optimizes the fit of N for M and as a result 
gives the optimal set of core banks. To obtain the total 
amount of errors simply add up the inconsistencies 
between the chosen model M and the observed network 
N. By dividing the total error by the total number of links 
in the observed network, the total error is normalized to 
obtain the error score.  
I follow the approach and part of the coding of Craig and 
von Peter (2014), who use a greedy algorithm to solve 
this optimization problem.  This greedy algorithm moves 
banks between core and periphery and does so by 
following the path of steepest descent, a key feature of 
greedy algorithms. In practice, this means that in every 
step the algorithm will switch the bank that contributes 
most to the error score from one tier to another. It will 
continue to do so until the total error score cannot be 
reduced any further.  
Testing for significance  
To test for significance I have taken the following 
approach: the CP model M is repeatedly applied to other 
networks. These networks are obtained from a random 
data-generating process in which tiering is not expected to 
emerge. The distribution of the error scores obtained from 
applying M to these random networks can then be 
compared to the error score from applying M to the original 
observed network N - in which, according to theory, tiering 
is expected to emerge.  
In practice, this approach comes down to the following: 
generate 1000 random networks of the same size and density 
as the observed interbank network N. Fit M to every 
generated random network, obtain the error scores, and plot 
these error scores. This is the empirical distribution function 
of the error score for a case where tiering is not expected to 
emerge. Following Craig and von Peter (2014), only if the 
error score of the interbank network N is lower than the 
bottom percentile of the empirical distribution function, does 
N have a significant degree of tiering.   
The specific type of random networks used in this paper to 
test for significance will be Erdös-Rényi (ER) random 
graphs.  
Layers  
As mentioned before, most interbank loans have a 
relatively short maturity, the majority being overnight 
loans. The theory on which the core-periphery model is 
built also assumes a liquid interbank market with loans of 
a relatively short maturity. Therefore, it is interesting to 
investigate whether the core-periphery model still holds 
for loans with a longer maturity, or whether it indeed 
deteriorates.  
To test for this, I divided the dataset into several layers, 
each containing loans with a different maturity. For each 
of these layers, I ran the same analysis as before. Now, the 
error score of each layer can be compared not only to the 
overall error score, but also to the other layers. This gives 
a better insight into the effect of maturity on the fit of the 
CP model.  
  
DATA DESCRIPTION  
Dataset  
The dataset used for the analysis describes all the loans 
issued on the Russian interbank market between August 
1998 and November 2004. These loans were reported 
monthly. Only one month, January 2003, is missing. The 
database has been constructed by prof. Koen Schoors and dr. 
Alexei Karas (Karas and Schoors, 2010) from a private 
information company called Banksrate.ru.  
For the purpose of this paper, the dataset has been altered in 
several ways. First, it was converted from monthly to 
quarterly. Second, only the entries where either the begin of 
month balance, the debit turnover, the credit turnover or the 
end of period balance is higher than 100 million rubles were 
kept - this to stick to a similar threshold as previous papers 
(1.5 million euros in the case of Craig and von Peter, 2014 
and in ‘t Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014) have done, for 
comparison purposes.  
The Russian interbank market between 1998-2004  
Between 1998-2004, the Russian interbank market evolved 
from a growing to a mature market. During growth phase, 
both the number of active banks and the transaction intensity 
steadily increases. During the mature phase, the number of 
active banks stabilizes; only the number of transactions still 
intensifies.   
Descriptives  
Throughout the sample period, the number of Russian 
banks active on the interbank market with transactions 
above 100 million rubles varied between 79 and 458, 
which is on average 23 percent of the total amount of 
(licensed) Russian banks. Figure 2 plots the number of 
banks active.  
The network is relatively sparse, with on average only 
1.1 percent of all possible links materializing. The 
sparsity of the Russian interbank market is less than the 
Dutch and UK markets, which have a respective sparsity 
of about 8 and 3 percent, but higher than the German 
interbank market, which has a sparsity of only 0.6 
percent (in ‘t Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014).  
  
Figure 2: Number of Russian banks active on the 
interbank market between 1998 and 2004.  
  
RESULTS OF CP-MODEL ESTIMATION  
For my analysis I used two software packages: Stata, a 
general-purpose statistical software package for the basic 
descriptives and data selection, and MATLAB, a numerical 
computing environment for running the algorithm and 
processing the results.  
Estimating the core  
Similarly to the approach of Craig and von Peter (2014), I 
will first focus on a mid-sample quarter, namely Q3 of 
2002. In this quarter, 345 banks were active on the Russian 
interbank market (out of 1345 banks registered in total). 
The optimal core consisted of 17 banks. This is a relatively 
small subset, namely 4.8 percent of all active banks. The 
total amount of errors added up to 672, where the total 
amount of links equaled 1255. This results in an error score 
of 53.5 percent for the network links. Normalizing instead 
by the dimension of the network (N*(N-1)) shows that only 
0.52 percent of all the cells are not consistent with the 
model.  
Figure 3 shows the fraction of banks belonging to the core 
estimated per quarter and Figure 4 shows the error score.  
  
Figure 3: Fraction of all active banks that are classified 
as a core bank per quarter.  
  
Figure 4: Error score per quarter.  
Layers  
As mentioned previously, I split the dataset into three 
layers: overnight (maturity 0-1 days), short term (2-7 days) 
and long term (> 8 days). As expected, the number of active 
banks, number of core banks, and total error score drops for 
all layers, as there are simply fewer entries. However, for 
both the overnight and the short term layer the total error 
score and the fraction of active banks belonging to the core 
is very similar to the baseline. The long term layer is a 
different story: here, the error score is significantly higher. 
Table 1 compares the results of all layers, taking the 
average of the variables over the entire sample period. The 
results are in accordance with earlier research by Van Soom 
(2016), which concluded that "it [the CP structure] breaks 
down for longer terms and time windows".  
  
Table 1: Comparison of active banks belonging to core 
and error score between the different layers and the 
baseline.  
Significance  
The CP model M is applied to 1000 randomly generated 
Erdös-Rényi (ER) random graphs, with similar size and 
density as the Russian interbank network N (n=304, 
p=0.011). The found error score is tightly centered around 
0.93. The best-fitting instance has an error score of 0.903. 
Clearly, these error scores do not come close to the value 
of 0.54, the error score found by applying the CP model to 
the Russian interbank data. Hence, I reject the hypothesis 
that randomly generated ER networks portray a similar 
degree of tiering as the Russian interbank network N: the 
tiering observed in N is not purely the result of random 
statistical processes. Therefore, the results are significant.  
Comparison with earlier research  
Table 2 compares findings from previous literature that 
applied the CP model to an interbank market with the 
findings of this paper. The comparison only includes 
those papers that used the exact same procedure as this 
paper: a threshold of 1.5 million euros / 100 million 
rubles and quarterly data. From Table 2 it is can be 
concluded that the Russian interbank market in many 
ways lies inbetween the Dutch and the German interbank 
market regarding its structure. The only result that truly 
stands out is the error score: it is much higher for the 
Russian market.  
  
Table 2: A comparison of the CP model fit between Russia, 
The Netherlands (in ‘t Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014) and 
Germany (Craig and von Peter, 2014).  
  
ESTIMATION VIA BANK SHEET VARIABLES  
The previous sections mainly focused on the question to 
what extent the core-periphery model fits the Russian 
interbank market. However, such an analysis requires 
bilateral data on interbank exposure. In practice this data is 
not available in many countries. Therefore, this section will 
take a different approach: is it possible to predict what 
banks make up the core of the network using a single bank-
specific feature? This will be investigated by using a probit 
regression, where the dependent variable is a binary 
variable denoting core membership as predicted by the CP 
model: bi = 1 if bank i belongs to the core and 0 otherwise. 
The independent variable is an individual bank sheet 
variable. The aim is to detect the single independent 
variable that has the largest predictive value.  
Dataset bank balance sheet  
The basis of the dataset that was used for this analysis 
contains balance sheet variables of all Russian banks. It 
was constructed by dr. Alexei Karas and prof. Koen 
Schoors as well. Karas and Schoors (2010) provides an 
overview of how this dataset was assembled.   
Result of the probit regression  
Table 3 reports the result of the probit regression. This 
regression tests whether core membership can be 
predicted using a single bank sheet variable. The 
regressors are shown in the rows. The columns show the 
regression outcomes.  
  
Table 3: Results of probit regression on several 
independent variables. Significance is denoted by ** (p < 
0.01) and * (p < 0.05) .  
  
The relevant indicators to look at in the results of the 
probit regression are as follows: 1) the percentage of all 
banks that are classified correctly, 2) the percentage of 
banks that are classified as a core bank (c) given that the 
true status of the bank is also a core bank (C), and 3) the 
percentage of banks that are classified as a core bank (c) 
given that the true status is that of a periphery bank (P).  
Clearly, the first two indicators (total percentage 
classified correctly and (c|C) are ideally as high as 
possible, while (c|P) is ideally as low as possible.  
As shown by Table 3, the variable Intermediation has the 
highest predictive value. This variable measures the 
volume each bank intermediates, by taking the minimum 
of its interbank lending and borrowing.  It is best able to 
predict those banks belonging to the core (59 percent 
classified correctly) and is best at not including periphery 
banks in the core in its prediction (1 percent of periphery 
banks classified incorrectly as core banks).  
  
DISCUSSION  
Even though this paper found that the core-periphery model 
provides a relatively good and statistically significant fit to 
the Russian interbank market, the error score is still 
remarkably higher than those of comparable papers. This 
can have several reasons, the most obvious one being that 
during the sample period (1998-2004), the Russian 
interbank market could not be classified as mature yet. An 
alternative explanation is that the sample data covers two 
crisis periods: in crisis periods, known structures disappear 
and others arise, which might also explain the poor fit.  
Suggestions for further research include additional research 
into other not fully mature markets, a more thorough 
investigation of the fit of the CP model during various 
crises, and looking further into combinations of 
independent variables yielding the highest predictive value 
in the probit regression.  
  
CONCLUSION  
To conclude, the core-periphery model provides a good fit 
to the Russian interbank market, although the found error 
score of 54 % is significantly higher than that of several 
more mature interbank markets. Furthermore, separating 
the data into several layers of different maturity reveals that 
the fit of the core-periphery model deteriorates as maturity 
increases, in line with expectations. Finally, the core can 
also be predicted using specific individual bank sheet 
variables instead of bilateral interbank data. The variable 
that measures the volume a bank intermediates provides the 
best fit for this, indicating that intermediation is a key 
feature of core banks.   
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